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1. Introduction    
 
Police corruption may appear as a quite circumscribed subject. At least it has been 
treated as such in most research directed at it.  It is quite obvious, however, that the 
police as the most directly interfering among the  repressive public institutions have 
strong impact on the transaction technology, the allowable interpersonal behaviour 
and the de facto determination of property rights in any society through their ability to 
sanction and punish with or without basis in law. Recently the degree of protection of 
property rights – widely defined -  has been considered as a key institution and as-
signed large weight in determining economic growth rates recently Acemoglu, John-
son  and Robinson (2001, 2005). The police together with the courts are the institution 
most directly involved in determining and defending the actual distribution of prop-
erty rights. 
 
Not only the actual degree of protection, but also the legitimacy of the actual distribu-
tion of property rights (cf. Proudhon’s old dictum: “Property is theft”) has been dem-
onstrated to be important in economic development (ibid.). Illegitimate distributions 
are usually also highly skewed and seem to have  strong  impact on crime rates. That 
is they have impact on the set of police tasks. To disclose the connections between 
economic inequality and economic growth is a key and persistent theme in economic 
development research.   Again the police are an important link in an  institutional 
nexus  now considered  key to development. 
 
 The police have the potential to bolster the legitimacy of the state and enhance ac-
countability between the state and its citizens, but it may also become a negative force 
undermining trust in state institutions and better governance. Corruption is a pervasive 
and historically persistent part of many police organizations (Faull 2007: 1). It arises 
in the daily routines of the police. The police’s right to use violence in order to 
achieve its bureaucratic aims influences its rent collection possibilities.   
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 In the many slum areas of the poorer countries where the authorities are not in full 
control, the police’s instruments of violence are often actively in use to determine the 
short run allocation of property rights, collect taxes (bribes) and overview law and 
order to the degree that it exists. Police corruption in these settings may increase the 
uncertainty of the property rights of the very poor, rights that often are threatened by 
semi-legal actions of the well-off as well as by actions of neighbourhood criminals.  
 
Another important transmission mechanism that links police corruption to develop-
ment is working through crime. High crime rates may have devastating impacts on 
investments and economic growth. Countries with high crime rates often find it diffi-
cult to attract, retain, and expand private investment.1 In addition to deterring invest-
ments, crime has direct costs on firms (and households) through theft losses and in 
security-related expenses, which translate into reduced competitiveness and lower in-
vestment (sometimes even disinvestments).  
 
The main purpose of this paper is to explore and clarify the relations between police 
corruption and the more fundamental welfare-shaping processes in poor and semi-
poor countries. We will discuss how. Some research has already been done that links 
crime and violence to economic inequality (Bourguignon, 1999). The relationships 
between growth and economic inequality are a perennial in macroeconomic research. 
Corruption in general has been linked to both, but few mechanisms have been pre-
sented. We will point to one.  
 
Research on the roles and behaviour of the police has been almost neglected in devel-
opment research. It has mainly been a matter of criminology.  During the period of 
decolonization, however, observers and practitioners were acutely aware of the role of 
the police and judiciary for development. How eruptions of violence and development 
might be interlinked was a question of survival for old and new political elites alike. 
Social scientists have applied ‘modernization’ theories to analyze these linkages. For 
example, they were subtly dealt with in Samuel Huntington’s book, Political Order in 
                                                 
1 The World Bank’s doing business surveys find that African business leaders are twice as likely to say 
that crime is a major impediment investment than their peers in other parts of the world (World Bank 
2007).  
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Changing Societies (1968). Huntington tied together corruption and violence – hence, 
also the behaviour of the police - to similar forces of deep economic and social 
change as Emile Durkheim (1897) once did for crime and suicide. While the police 
generally have been considered less ‘glamorous’ than the military, at least the role of 
the police in India was the subject of an extensive modernization analysis by David 
Bayley (1969) in the volume The Police and Political Development in India.  
 
Recently, extensive research has been conducted in areas relevant for the analysis of 
police corruption: (i) the economics of crime and corruption in general have gained 
increasing interest since the late 1970s; and (ii) the economics of armed conflicts 
started to grow around 1980.2 In particular, there has been much focus on larger scale 
civil war, but an important outgrowth has been the study of illegal markets and organ-
ized crime. One important result of this research is the demonstration that the optimal 
scale of organized crime units is clearly linked to police behaviour, increasing with its 
degree of corruption and inefficiency (Reuter 1983). 
 
The criminal justice system as it is known today evolved during the same historical 
period as the modern state arose (Newman and Howard in Newman ed. 1999). This 
also applies to most police organizations. The police are everywhere a public, bureau-
cratic organization with clear hierarchic features and with the same core tasks al-
though differing in details. This implies that observations and experiences from one 
country might be relevant for others. Well-documented case studies of corruption in 
police organizations in cities like New York, Los Angeles or London may prove more 
relevant for the understanding of police corruption in Mumbai or Jakarta than the 
striking differences in the surrounding poverty and efficiency levels would lead us to 
believe. The information on the internal organization of police corruption is not, how-
ever, in a form that easily allows cross-country quantitative comparisons. We will 
mainly study the roles of the police and its task structure in areas where the political 
leadership of a country is not physically threatened, but where corruption is extensive 
in the government apparatus. When physically threatened, a more explicit analysis of 
the police’s political roles is required. 
 
                                                 
2 Both built upon earlier extensions of economics, i.e. the economics of crime (Becker 1968) and the 
economics of organizations (Williamson 1981).  
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The paper explores whether the police is more or less corrupt than other groups of 
public officials, how – and why - it may vary across countries and whether it may 
have some impact on crime rates. One of the key difficulties when relating police cor-
ruption to crime rates is that it together with the overall police efficiency may have 
significant impact on crime statistics. It influences both the public’s and the police’s 
reporting of crime. Crime rates and crime reporting rates receive considerable atten-
tion in the paper.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 starts out by establishing a working defi-
nition of police corruption, which includes acts of extortion by the police. It also in-
cludes a brief discussion of data sources for analyzing police corruption. In Section 3 
police tasks and their scope for corruption are addressed. Section 4 examines whether 
and why some types of public officials are more corrupt. How and why police corrup-
tion varies across countries are examined in Section 5, followed by a discussion in 
Section 6 of the wider impacts of police corruption on development. Section 7 con-
cludes by exploring policy measures to address police corruption. 
 
 
2. Police corruption: definitions and data 
In this section we present a definition of police corruption, which is tailored to the 
phenomena we are focusing on. We will also briefly discuss properties of the data, 
including some of their weakness, which forms the basis of the analysis. Evidently, 
the data contain large measurement errors, but we believe they present more valid in-
formation than the alternatives of aggregate governance indicators, official police reg-
istered crime statistics or the alternative of rejecting quantitative data  altogether.    
 
2.1 Police corruption defined 
The police constitute in most ways a regular public bureaucracy. Police corruption 
should, therefore, for most purposes not be defined differently than corruption in gen-
eral. The standard definition in the literature (Nye 1967: 416) embraces most conceiv-
able forms of police corruption: 
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behavior that deviates from the formal duties of a public role (elective or ap-
pointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) 
wealth or status gains.   
 
For many purposes this definition is too wide and vague. A definition tailored to po-
lice behavior may be the following: 
An act is commercially corrupt if a member of an organization uses his/her po-
sition, his/her rights to make decisions, access to information, or other resources 
of the organization, to the advantage of a third party and thereby receives money 
or other economically valuable goods or services where either the payment itself 
or the services provided are illegal and/or against the organization’s own aims 
or rules.  
 
Here we will look at the police in areas where agents in public bureaucracies often have 
conflicting loyalties. If the police official is mainly serving the interests of his or her 
ethnic group, profession, friends or family, or any other form of external network of 
which the agent is a member, it is an act of relation-based corruption.  Commercial and 
relation based corruption constitute corruption in the narrow or transaction based sense.  
 
Second, an act represents embezzlement if a member of an organization uses his/her 
rights to make decisions, his/her labor time, access to information or some tangible as-
sets of the organization to his own economic advantage, eventually to the advantage of 
some other member of the organization, in ways that are either illegal or against the or-
ganization’s own aims or rules. Embezzlement might also be motivated to achieve the 
individual’s standing in family-friendship networks. 
 
 Third,  
corrupt forms of extortions are predatory acts where an agent uses his/her position in an 
organization to make threats and thereby gains involuntary transfers of resources from 
individuals or outside organizations against the organization’s own formally stated in-
terest.3 Among the non-monetized resource transfer is sexual ’services’. It embraces 
only rapes as related to the rapist’s position in the organization.    
 
Finally, police officials may engage in ordinary crimes such as stealing or sexual crimes 
when they are partly unrelated to his or her position as a member of a police bureauc-
racy. 
                                                 
3 Many observers have pointed out that much of the police misuse of their instruments of violence is 
not instrumental at all, but rather expressive, expressing feelings of anger or fear. In that case the mis-
use of position is not corruption in our sense, but in practice it appears to be strongly correlated and 
difficult to disentangle from more instrumental use of violence and other forms of police corruption. In 
the investigation of police corruption in New York in the early 1990s the Mollen-commission (1994: 
46) found that the group of corruption suspects on average had five times so many allegations of un-
necessary use of force as the non-suspects.    
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 While extortion plays a more important role in the police than in other bureaucracies, 
and is on the list of corrupt actions, it may be performed for ‘Dirty Harry’- reasons, or 
for pure evil. In most cases is extortion combined with more or less complex forms of 
information management. The intention with the definitions is to focus on the workings 
of a police organization and how corruption influences it. 
 
2.2 Data sources 
In most of this study we have used the so-called international crime victimization sur-
veys (ICVS) or other forms of crime experience-related  data (including corruption) 
when assessing crime levels.4 Basically, these surveys report the households’ experi-
ences of crime the last year or during the last five years. The ICVS data are surpris-
ingly scanty and approximate, however, even for easily observable crime events. They 
are not produced annually for any country. Hence, when we compare crime victimiza-
tion rates between two countries or calculate their average as part of a regional aver-
age, there may be huge divergences in time between when the observations were 
made. For instance, one set of observations may have been made a decade before the 
observations of another country. In developing countries the data are often based on 
samples from one city only. Thus, the data are not likely to be representative for the 
country as a whole. Most figures in the following sections must therefore be read as 
tentative suggestions about the crime situation in the country or region in question. 
The reason for referring to these data is that compared to the alternative, i.e. the po-
lice reported crime levels; the ICVS data have at least a plausible fairly direct rela-
tionship to reality. The possibility that answers to such questionnaires main contain a 
host of measuring errors, is obvious, however. But we know that the data based on 
police reported crime are misleading. Their use has already caused substantial misun-
derstandings about the relationship between crime and development. 
 
Another source of data we use is the so called ‘diagnostic’ corruption surveys initiated 
by the World Bank Institute (but sponsored and implemented by several other institu-
tions). They have only been conducted in a few countries.5  Fairly small samples of 
                                                 
4 http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/SERIES/00175.xml 
5http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/0,,contentMDK:207
26148~menuPK:1928498~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:1740530,00.html 
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households, enterprises and public officials have been asked about their experiences 
with and perceptions of various corruption-related issues. While the ‘diagnostic sur-
veys’ appear to be of uneven quality and only a few are comparable, they yield indica-
tive results about differences in behavior across groups of public officials. The same 
applies to the recent ‘Global Corruption Barometers’ initiated and published by 
Transparency International.6 However, the latter does not control for the different in-
teraction frequencies between households and various public sector agencies and offi-
cials. We will also refer to the Afrobarometer-surveys.7 
   
3. Police tasks and their scope for corruption   
The police as a public bureaucracy has (a) the right to apply legitimate means of vio-
lence to control the movement of groups and individuals within a set part of space ac-
cording to a set of rules. To effectuate that control it has to (b) perform systematic 
monitoring of urban and rural space. However, it is not supposed to control large-
scale, armed groups, although paramilitary sections of the police may deal with me-
dium-sized ones. This section outlines the major roles of the police, the tasks they do 
and how corruption may enter during the performance of policing.  
  
3.1 The police as service provider 
The police are a public and formal organization. Most of its daily tasks are ideally di-
rected towards serving ordinary citizens and provide them with security of life and 
personal property against potential threats from others. Some of these tasks are speci-
fied further in this section. A key task is to prevent the members of the public to in-
flict harm on each other through actions of violence and theft (e.g. assaults, rape, rob-
bery, pick-pocketing, and burglaries). These are criminal acts with clear victims. In 
practice, most of the regulation is taking place ex post through the apprehension and 
punishment of the harm-doers, but an important aim is that this will also reduce the 
incidence of crimes.8  
 
                                                 
6 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb 
7 http://www.afrobarometer.org/surveys.html 
8 In addition to state or municipal monitoring various forms informal monitoring of individual trans-
gressions take place, some complementary (e.g. neighborhood watches), and some competing (e.g. 
warlords, mafias) with the state.  
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The police are also supposed to monitor laws where their violation does not create 
immediate harm to any victim, so called victimless crime. The typical case here is 
markets that are branded illegal by the law, such as drugs, sexual services and gam-
bling. Illegal markets give scope to economies of scale in crime and therefore organ-
ized forms of crime. An important role of the police is to keep the scale economies 
low. 
 
The police are supposed to bring forward information about crimes that can determine 
the exact state of violation and the likely perpetrators if the case is brought to court. 
When there are no immediate victims and all the individuals involved in a criminal act 
have advantage of it, they will not report it. The police itself must investigate whether 
a criminal act has been performed and generally engage in more active information 
search in order to have any impact on victimless crime. Therefore the corruption risks 
here are exceptionally high.   
 
The number of crime cases will normally be in excess of capacity even when the 
court’s standards of proof are lax. The police participate in most rationing systems for 
the caseload of the courts and may profit on that. The court’s standards and proce-
dures may have other feedback effects on the behaviour of the police. For example, if 
courts are corrupt and their decisions are sold and bought, the strategic situation of the 
police, and its prospects for gaining income corruptly, will be profoundly influenced. 
 
The most visible task of the police is to have physical control of suspected perpetra-
tors till they are transported to separate prisons where they may be more easily con-
trolled. The degree of outside (often court) insight into this imprisonment has also im-
portant impacts on the potential of police corruption. 
 
It is the police’s possession of instruments of force that is its distinguishing character-
istic. The police’s use or non-use of physical force may have important impacts on 
society. Since both the use and the threats of using violence may act as strong incen-
tives, the police may apply them both as instruments in preventing crime, in simple 
extortion, or in more complex corrupt strategies of information handling and interac-
tion with citizens.  
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3.2 The police as elite defender 
The second major role of the police is to protect the political elite against potential, 
larger scale violent actions directed against it or indirectly challenging it.9 Closely 
related are police efforts to contain (or participate in) violent behaviour in high- vio-
lence areas. In many countries this task is mainly latent, but even in politically stable 
countries it becomes visible in slum areas or under political demonstrations and simi-
lar events. While latent, it implies that the political elite must take a keen interest in 
police organizations and their leaderships. Crime rates and crime statistics are gener-
ally politically sensitive issues.  
 
The knowledge within the police that it has the particular task of defending the elite 
will often have major impacts on its behaviour. Like any other bureaucracy the police 
is sensitive towards even informal signals sent by superiors. In the case of serious cor-
ruption at the political level, the police are likely to be involved, if not directly so in-
directly by protecting the elite against prosecution. The degree of legitimacy of the 
regime to be defended will often have strong implications for police behaviour and 
the degree of force it metes out.    
 
3.3 Organizing principles of police tasks  
When comparing police corruption between countries we should note that all police 
tasks as defined here may be allocated to the police proper or may be divided between 
different institutions: traffic police, customs, immigration authorities or tax collecting 
agencies. Typically, customs officers may have some police, some tax collecting and 
some health inspection tasks. When comparing corruption levels of the police across 
countries, the fact that the detailed task distribution may differ must be kept in mind. 
 
Almost equally important as a distinguishing characteristic of the police in both 
peaceful and more violent settings is its spatiality. Monitoring the many different 
forms of crime implies some form of (weak) control of space. Localized crime spill-
overs and wide dispersion of crime rates across different geographical areas tend to 
make the core of the police to be organized according to geographical, not functional 
principles. Rural and urban crime patterns and policing issues, for instance, are nor-
                                                 
9 A typical example of the latter in the case of politically stable countries is the gang ‘controlled’ areas 
of some US cities. 
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mally very different. Here are two examples of how this monitoring of space gives 
rise to rent extraction possibilities for the police:  
Box 1. Police extortion in rural Cambodia 
The family of Mr. Wan in rural Cambodia has 10 children. The family owns a small boat, but 
not the land where their house is located. Mrs. Wan tells that sometimes the police arrive when 
her husband is out fishing and she at times feels forced to give them money, although they do 
not explain why they are visiting her. But she pays out of fear of losing the boat, a fear the po-
lice are aware of.  Evidently the police are able to collect very detailed information and are able 
to monitor very closely the rural space of which they are responsible for in order to find the vul-
nerable Wan-family, and visit it at the exact right time in order to milk it in the way described. 
 
Source: Nissen (2005: 65-66). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 2. Police extortion in urban India 
These stories from a slum in New Dehli are reported by the newspaper The Hindi (10 May 
2003). They show that systematic police monitoring of the urban space to acquire information 
about crime (e.g. illegal immigration) also gave scope for profitable police corruption: 
 
Officials of the Slum and JJ Department of Municipal Corporation of Delhi and the ‘mukhbirs’ 
(informers) of the Delhi police are literally fleecing the poor living in dingy and shanty jhuggis 
of one of this largest slum clusters of the Yamuna riverbanks. 
 
“They [the police] have made our lives miserable. We do not know when we will be thrown out 
of our jhuggis. Officials of the Slum Wing and ‘mukhbirs’ of the Delhi police land up any time 
and demand money. They threaten us that if we do not pay, they would brand us as Bangla-
deshis and throw us out of our jhuggis. Several people have been thrown out of their jhuggis 
along with their family members even at midnight,” alleged Seema, a local community leader 
and a member of the Communist Party of India. 
 
Giving a list of at least 60 jhuggis from where the occupants have been thrown out by officials 
of the Slum Wing and ‘mukhbirs’, Seema claimed that almost all of them have been resold at a 
premium. “If anyone dares to protest or lodges a complaint, he is harassed by the police and ar-
rested”, she said. “`We are living under the terror of mukhbirs and Slum Department officials.” 
 
“Last week my clothes were torn apart by one of the mukhbirs after my husband could not pay 
the money demanded by him. Then we were taken to the police chowki where we were told that 
we will be deported as we are Bangladeshi citizens. We were allowed to go free only after we 
sold the rickshaw we had and paid the money to the mukhbir. My jhuggi is still to be desealed”, 
said Shakina Begum with tears in her eyes. Similar is the story of a large number of people stay-
ing in these slum clusters, the majority of whom are from a particular religious community. 
“Concerned officials are taking advantage of this very fact. If we are Bangladeshis, we should 
be deported. If we are not, then why are we being harassed”, asked Zamruddin, who was badly 
beaten up by a ‘mukhbir’' last week. “'What is more worrisome is that these informers of the 
police are acting as policemen”, Ms. Seema alleged. 
 
Source: The Hindu (10May 2003). 
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With regard to the handling of violent areas and situations, the importance of the vio-
lence and spatial characteristics of the police becomes even more apparent than under 
stable conditions. As violent conflicts shift in intensity and scale, the role of the police 
and the police organization itself may be substantially modified. In many countries 
the police have paramilitary divisions or paramilitary organizations that are assigned 
to handle the intermediate scales of conflict. But at the high scale end of violence it 
will be the military that has the main responsibility to defend the political elite against 
potential rebels, and the roles of the police will again change as it will be subject to 
coordination with the military. The role of the police in full-scale civil wars is obvi-
ously most important in their build-ups and aftermaths.10 
 
3.4 Typical corrupt police-citizen transactions 
Police corruption has many faces. Based on research from a number of countries we 
may establish a typology of corrupt police acts: 
 
A) Pure extortion: The police may arrest people they know are innocent threatening 
them or beating them and then release them against payment. The payment may 
sometimes be in forced sexual services. This is a pure extortion case.  It is easier to 
perform when the police have great freedom to arrest and temporary jail suspects 
independent of the courts.  ‘Suspects’ may, however, also be apprehended in the 
field, beaten and forced to pay in order to get out of that situation before a formal 
arrest. If the police are given substantial freedom to temporarily arrest people, this 
form of extortion may be performed with ease even in the police-managed jails. A 
‘classical’ case of extortion is to inflict harm against establishments or individuals 
that are unwilling to pay (illegally) the standard rate for police protection.  
B) Extortion with the involvement of courts: If the courts have to get involved, the ex-
tortion of innocents may often be combined with fraud, e.g. forging of the evi-
dence sent to the courts. A classical case is when the police plant evidence, ‘flak-
ing’, for example by putting heroin in the pocket of the suspect (see e.g. Knapp 
1972: 103). Individuals who are in a weak position either because of former crimi-
                                                 
10 The role of the latter is underlined by present developments in Afghanistan.  A key worry of the in-
ternational forces in Afghanistan, is that when they have cleared  an area for major Taliban forces and  
return the area to the control of the Afghan police, the latter are too weak militarily and too corrupt to 
hold the area, and  Taliban reappears (David Rohde: ‘Afghan police are set back as Taliban adapt’, 
New York Times, September 2, 2007).  
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nal record, or being a member of a politically weak ethnic group, are exceptionally 
vulnerable. The worse the reputation of the police and courts, the greater, pre-
sumably, is the willingness to pay. The negative consequences of these forms of 
police corruption for the distribution of justice and citizens’ feeling of security are 
obvious. 
C)  Corrupt transactions: These are cases where the police illegally sell decisions or 
information that are to the advantage of individuals who are guilty in a crime. This 
may be warnings about planned police inspections of illegal establishments, bribes 
to avoid a traffic charges for violations committed or ‘sales’ of decisions not to 
register a crime. When prostitution is illegal, prostitutes may pay with sexual ser-
vices in order to avoid arrests. 
D) Mixed extortion and bribery: If the police confine a known criminal and/or beat 
him up in order to increase his willingness to pay for avoiding prosecution, bribery 
is mixed with extortion. This way of keeping committed crimes outside the public 
jurisdiction of the courts is particularly important in the case of ‘victimless crime’. 
Then no one will complain if the case rests with the police. When the criminal in 
question performs a more or less continuous stream of criminal acts, the threat of 
arresting if not paid, can be classified as a form of extortion or illegal taxation. Al-
ternatively, it may be considered as a ‘regular’ form of corrupt transactions where 
the police sell the capital value of its decision not to arrest as the bribe. The most 
visible form of police corruption, the open collection of bribes by the traffic police, 
is mostly observed in low income countries. Here the bribes for not charging the 
guilty are mixed with extortion paid for not charging the innocent in the same 
stream of corrupt charges.  
E) Embezzlement: Policemen and women may embezzle funds or record time off as 
hours worked - like agents in most other organizations, but they have larger oppor-
tunities, particularly at the front level. This is reported in a number of public com-
missions. Embezzlement is often combined with theft. When arrested, suspects 
have to deliver their valuables into police custody. The arresting police may use 
their position to steal some of these valuables. This is particularly easy in the case 
of stolen or illegal goods, since the crime suspects then are not in a position to 
raise public claims. Even if they do object, the police have the advantage that 
criminals’ claims have lower credibility. Through their fighting or interaction with 
criminals and criminal organizations, and through their monitoring of urban and 
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rural space, the police acquire information about potentially profitable opportuni-
ties of crime. If a policeman acts on this information and performs the crime on his 
own (e.g. burglary), he will in addition have embezzled the information acquired 
through his position for his own or his colleagues’ gain.11 
 
3.5 Typical internal corruption procedures 
Police corruption can be broken into a number of different, typical acts. When corrup-
tion is extensive and organized, the police will commonly develop procedures for trans-
ferring the corruptly acquired money upwards. Superiors may collect income upfront 
before the frontline has actually collected it, by renting out promotions and postings, 
particularly postings with high (illegal) income potential.12 In more decentralized sys-
tems they may also get actively involved in the actual collection of illegal income.  
 
4. Are the police more corrupt than other public officials? 
It is not obvious that corruption rates are separated more sharply by national borders 
than by professional lines. In this section we will mainly compare police corruption 
with corruption in other public bureaucracies within the same country. In a globalized 
world with extensive international contacts we may expect considerable spillovers 
across borders between public health officials, central bankers, customs officers and 
police officers, at least at the higher rank levels. The restraints facing a police officer 
in Nairobi may be more similar to the restraints of a police officer in New York than 
the restraints facing a teacher in Mombasa. 
 
4.1 Are the police exceptionally corrupt? Some evidence 
The variation in corruption rates between professional groups of public officials is 
considerable, and appears relatively invariant across countries at similar income lev-
els. Some public sectors appear more exposed to corruption than others even at all 
                                                 
11 A famous case (the ‘Ramparts’ scandal) took place in Los Angeles in 1997 when a police officer 
joined in the robbery of a branch of Bank of America. His role was discovered and it led to extensive 
investigation of different corrupt police networks, particularly elite ones that dealt with drug and gang 
investigations. The activities have been described in several public reports, for example, the report of 
the Park Commission (Park 2000).  
12 In a small survey from Bihar where the opinions of 300 Indian police officers were collected, 62% 
believed that “the superiors use their subordinates to earn illegitimate income for themselves” (Sharma 
2002: 219). The classical analytical description of an upward transfer system of bribe incomes within a 
South Asian bureaucratic context is Wade (1982), which provides a detailed account of corruption in 
canal irrigation schemes in South India.  
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income levels. For instance, in almost any country we find that public procurement 
(especially defence procurement), building- and land-use regulation agencies are more 
exposed than other parts of the public sector. Here, politicians are often involved.  
The daily illegal charges levied on households and enterprises, however, are mainly 
phenomena of low income countries. This means that corruption in sectors like health, 
education and particularly the police are different in rich and poor countries, respec-
tively, but among the low income countries a fairly consistent pattern emerges.  
  
Police corruption may be compared to corruption in other agencies simply by asking 
respondents in different countries how corrupt they perceive the police to be com-
pared to other groups. This has been done by Transparency International (TI) and is 
published in their Global Corruption Barometers (TI 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007). The 
question asked is: “To what extent do you perceive the following sectors to be af-
fected by corruption? (1: not at all corrupt, …, 5: extremely corrupt)”.  Table 1 sum-
marizes the results. The table includes the police, the judiciary, politicians and educa-
tors: 
 
Table 1. How corrupt are public officials perceived to be?  
                        Regional distribution 2006 
 
  Political 
parties 
Police Legal 
system 
judiciary
Educational 
system 
Africa 4.2 4.6 4.0 3.8 
Asia-Pacific 4.0 3.8 3.3 3.1 
South East Europe 4.0 3.9 4.1 3.8 
EU and other Western 
Europe 3.7 2.7 2.9 2.3 
Latin America 4.2 4.2 4.1 3.0 
North America 4.2 3.1 3.5 2.9 
Former Socialist 
States 3.9 4.1 3.9 3.8 
    
Source: TI (2006): Table 6 
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In most high income areas, political parties are considered to be the most corrupt, 
while the police often are held in high regard.13 In most developing countries, how-
ever, the police is perceived as one of - if not the most - corrupt public bureaucracy 
(TI 2004, 2005, 2006). Furthermore, in the 18 African countries where group specific 
perceptions about corruption are registered in the Afrobarometer-surveys (rounds 1 
and 2), the police is ranked as the most corrupt in 14 countries, in three countries tax 
officials were ranked at the top, while only Cape Verde considered politicians as the 
most corrupt officials.  
 
This difference in perceptions may reflect the fact that street level corruption among 
police officers is rare in most developed countries, but common in most developing 
countries, as reflected in crime victimization statistics from UNICRI and in TI’s 
global barometers.14 In TI’s 2007 Global Barometer the households’ experience rates 
with different public agencies are summarized for all countries in the survey (TI, 
2007: 6).  The bribe frequency of citizens having had contact with the police (about 
16%-17%) was more than twice as high as for educational and medical services.  
 
TI does not report the frequency of encounters. Table 2 provides a more detailed pic-
ture based on a number of diagnostic reports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 In some Scandinavian countries, deservedly or not, the police is even considered to be one of the 
most - if not the most - trustworthy public organization. 
14 Exposing these data to statistical tests, Weber Abramo (2007) finds that a breaking point in behavior, 
i.e. when petty corruption recedes, takes place at an average income level around USD 10,000 per cap-
ita. 
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Table 2. Some observations on bribery in household – official interactions 
Country Year  Sectors Frequency of 
interaction % 
Frequency of 
bribing given 
interaction 
Bribing fre-
quency  
Bangladesh* 2002 Police* 10 84 8.4 
   Courts/judges 8 75 6 
    Education (adm.)  65 10 6.5 
    Health (admission) 61 48 29 
Cambodia** 2000 Police* 26 85 21 
    Courts/judges 8 68 8 
    Education  63 41 24 
    Health 52 57 28 
Cambodia*** 2005 Police* 16 58.5 9 
    Courts/judges 1 100 1 
    Education  72 33 24 
    Health 31 13 4 
India* 2002 Police* 4 100 4 
   Courts/judges 3 100 3 
    Education (adm.) 23 18 4 
    Health (admission) 32 20 6 
India’  2005 Police* 15 80 12 
    Courts/judges 13.4 47 6.3 
    Education (adm.) 40 18 7.2 
    Health 55 26.5 14.6 
Nepal* 2002 Police* 7 48 3.4 
   Courts/judges 5 42 2.1 
    Education (adm.) 85 7 6 
    Health (admission) 72 8 6 
Pakistan’’  2006 Police 42.4 90.2 38.3 
    Courts/judges 8.7 77.5 6.7 
    Education  *** *** 2.1 
    Health 8.2 67.2 5.5 
Pakistan* 2002 Police* 32 100 32 
   Courts/judges 6 96 5.8 
    Education (adm.) 11 71 7.8 
    Health (admission) 100 65 65 
Thailand’’’ 2000 Police* 29.2 8.5 2.5 
    Courts/judges *** *** *** 
    Education  32.4 1.5 0.5 
    Health 61.8 0.7 0.4 
Sri Lanka* 2002 Police* 36 100 36 
   Courts/judges 6 100 6 
    Education (adm.) 14 55 7.7 
    Health (admission) 100 18 18 
Sri Lanka’’’’ 2007 Police* 21.7 17 3.7 
    Courts/judges 7.4 5.9 0.4 
    Education (adm.) 11 10.1 1.1 
    Health 66.4 5.7 3.8 
Ghana 2000 Police 23.1 74.0 17.1 
  Courts/judges 8.4 52.8 4.4 
  Education 45.1 23.9 10.8 
  Health 64.5 30.3 19.5 
  
Sources: * TI (2002),**World Bank, 2000, ***Center for Social Development (2005), ‘TI India( 2005,various 
volumes),’’TI Pakistan (2006),’’’Phongpaichit et al (2000),’’’’Centre for Policy Alternatives (2007). 
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We note that in 11 of the 12 investigations reported in Table 2, the police have the 
highest frequency of bribing given an encounter with a household.15 The encounters 
between households and the police are normally rarer than their meetings with the 
educational or health systems, however, (but more frequent than encounters with the 
court). Hence, the number of bribes paid to the health and education officials may 
sometimes be higher, and since the bribes paid to the courts tend to be exceptionally 
large, the latter may cause the largest bribe expenses.. 
 
The large variation in the interaction patterns and bribe frequencies between the re-
ports summarized in Table 2, even for the same country, suggests large measurement 
errors. In some cases the incentives to over-report corruption appear to have been 
strong. The relative standing of police corruption is confirmed in a methodologically 
sound empirical study of the distribution of corruption propensities across different 
agencies in Peru (Hunt 2006). Hunt’s analysis is based on a large household survey  
By asking more detailed questions about their interactions, the survey also allows us 
to address the question “why are some public officials more corrupt than others?” in a 
more satisfactory way than other surveys known to us. The household is not only 
asked which organization they had to bribe, but about all the transactions they had 
with any of the listed public agencies. They were then asked about which of these 
transactions they had concluded with a bribe, and the size of the bribe.  
 
Hunt finds that the police and the judiciary are clearly the most corrupt agencies in 
Peru. While interactions with the police constitute only about 2% of the total official-
household interactions, the police participated in 35% of the households’ bribe trans-
actions. The transactions with the judiciary also constitute 2% of the total transac-
tions, but about 12% of the corrupt ones. The bribe fees of the judiciary are excep-
tionally high. The judiciary received 42% of the total bribe income, while the police 
received 27%. This implies that the judicial sector is involved in about half of all 
bribe transactions and receives more than two third of all bribe income from the 
household street level corruption.16 In comparison, state schools are involved in 21% 
of all household- official interactions, but only in 8% of the corrupt ones. State hospi-
                                                 
15 One exception is in the study from Cambodia (Nissen 2005), where the judiciary has the highest cor-
ruption rate, but the number of  judiciary-household interactions are low here.      
16 Enterprises were not involved in the survey. 
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tals are involved in13% of all transactions and 4% of the corrupt ones. This implies 
that if you engage with the police, the likelihood that you will pay a bribe is 46 times 
larger than if you transact with a school official - at that time in Peru. 
 
The survey from Peru does not cover business corruption, high-level corruption or 
most of transactions with organized crime. Even so the judicial sector, including the 
police, is clearly the most corrupt public sector in Peru and probably also in most 
other lower income countries. 
 
 
4.2 Why are some types of public officials more corrupt? Supply side explana-
tions17 
 
We are not aware of many scholarly attempts to answer this question. One is made by 
Recanatini et al (2005).18 Her analysis mainly emphasizes the supply characteristics 
of different public agencies: are decisions audited, procedures open and transparent, 
and personnel chosen on the basis of merit? It is also significant whether the top man-
ager of the bureaucracy has been popularly elected or not. Other aspects are also ex-
plored, however: Are its clients mainly households or businesses, its services exclu-
sive or not? The corruption assessment as well as the information about monitoring 
systems  is based on surveys of the public officials’ opinions.   
                                                
 
Recanatini et al. (2005) find corruption to be higher in organizations where audits of 
decisions are not regular, procedures are not transparent and employment and promo-
tions not based on clear criteria. If the top manager is popularly elected, corruption 
increases directly and the monitoring system weakens, inducing increased corruption. 
Corruption also increases when the public organization is a service monopoly and 
 
17 The use of what is ‘supply’ or what is ‘demand’ in the corruption literature may be somewhat arbi-
trary. Here we follow standard economics in the sense that we consider the agent who supply a real 
service as the supplier, not the agent that supplies the payment (in this case the bribe). This does not fit 
well in the case of extortions or embezzlements, but in these cases we may look at the public agency as 
the one that has allowed these acts to happen. 
18 They use the World Bank Institute’s surveys of public officials from a number of countries in Africa 
and Latin America. The main ideas of these surveys, which contain a wealth of information about cor-
ruption, are presented in Manning et al (2000). As pointed out in Recantini et al (2005) this source has 
been underused in empirical corruption research. However, this series of surveys appear to have been 
discontinued. 
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mainly deals with business and not private citizens. Corruption in public procurement 
is found to be the most serious and frequent. 
 
These factors give some, but not strong reasons to expect the police to be exception-
ally corrupt: We may expect it to be less transparent than other public agencies for 
security reasons. It has service monopoly in most areas for meting out violent action. 
While police chiefs are rarely popularly elected in a direct way (local police in the US 
police system is the most well-known exception), they are often appointed directly by 
the top political leadership. Neither did the authors find the judiciary (including the 
police) exceptionally corrupt. 19  
 
If the political leadership is physically challenged, the appointment of police leader-
ship will become strongly political and the supply mechanisms outlined by Recanatini 
et al (2005) may become strong. Since the police are more directly involved in the 
regime’s defense, the political leadership may allow it more freedom in cashing in on 
its corrupt income opportunities compared to other groups. The variation in regime 
legitimacy may have great power in explaining variation in police corruption across 
countries, but will be not pursued here.  
 
The so called ‘code of silence’ in the police has been invoked. Such codes seem to 
evolve strongly in professions that handle dangerous situations where mistakes are 
easily made. Benoit and Dubra (2004: 787) seek to explain “why law-abiding police-
men defend those who have broken the law?”  In a number of accounts of particularly 
corrupt police agencies, they demonstrate that most honest cops have protected illegal 
behavior of their colleagues or even participated in the bribe collection although the 
felt moral costs have been higher than their economic benefit. The police wall of si-
lence has its counterpart in the Mafia code of silence.   
 
Benoit’s and Dubra’s explanation relies on a situation where it is difficult for both in-
siders and outsiders to discriminate between good or bad actions. Honest cops may 
easily be punished by their colleagues’ bad’ behavior. If not supported by colleagues, 
                                                 
19 The police are included in their definition of the judiciary. But it is not clear from their paper to what 
extent regular police organizations were involved in these surveys. 
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you may be exposed to extreme danger.20  Hence, the distribution of the police offi-
cers who initially accept to engage in corrupt transactions may not be higher than for 
other agencies, and still a group of policemen may have higher propensity to engage 
in bribe transactions than corresponding groups of other public officials.  
   
An important aspect of police work that has been pointed out in number of studies, 
which may easily give rise to highly corrupt behaviour, is the difficult task to moni-
toring the frontline officers of the police compared to other public officials (e.g. Ivk-
ovic, 2005: 89). Since they may move freely around in space (within their set district) 
it is impossible for their supervisors to follow them all. In contrast, teachers and 
medical personnel normally work in set localities. Moreover, this gives scope for cor-
rupt police to roam about and search more freely for corrupt opportunities. Hence 
with a similar fraction of corrupt officials, the fraction of corrupt police transactions 
may be expected to be higher than for a public bureaucracy of the waiting-line type.     
 
To compare corruption frequencies purely from the supply side, we may estimate the 
fraction of corrupt officers to the total number of officials in each public sector. We 
are not aware of any attempt to do so, but Ivkovic (2005: 46) reports from a number 
of case studies of the police, but only from the US ( Boston, Chicago and Washing-
ton) that report on it. A surprisingly large fraction - between 17% and 24% - of the 
police officers had been involved in economic crimes.   
 
4.3 Why are some types of public officials more corrupt? Demand side explana-
tions 
 
Different groups of public officials either meet different groups of clients (citizens, 
organizations etc.) or clients in different situations. Hunt (2007) outlines one mecha-
nism that works mainly on the demand side. She notes that whenever a person is ex-
posed to a mishap of some kind or another, the need to contact a public official in-
creases. The person may also become more vulnerable to extortion.  
 
                                                 
20 Other explanations build more explicitly on the dangers the police are exposed to may prove more 
valid. At this point it is sufficient to note that a ‘blue wall of silence’ exists and will influence the cor-
ruption propensity of the police. 
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The health sector and the police supply services that meet people frequently in mishap 
situations. Hence, they should be more exposed to corruption than, for instance, 
schools or postal services. In quantitative terms, however, Hunt (2007) finds police 
corruption to be most significant. She explores the theory on the basis of two sets of 
data. One set is the ICVS data (where the rich countries have been ‘thrown out’), 
which only allows the study of the effects of crime mishaps on corruption. The second 
is the large data set from Peru where other mishaps that hit the household are re-
corded: the loss of job, death in the household, natural disasters, etc.   
 
Among the ICVS households (there are 37 countries in Hunt’s sample) the bribery 
rate was 19% among the crime victims and only about 7% for non-victims. In the 
Peru sample, the victims of nine different mishaps had a bribery rate of almost 9% 
while non-victims had a bribery rate of 4%. Households exposed to crime, shop bank-
ruptcy, fire of the house etc. were roughly involved in three times as many bribery 
episodes as their share in the total sample of interactions. The bribery rate of ‘death of 
earner’, ‘desertion of household head’ and ‘serious illness/accident’ households was 
less, but still twice the rate of a ‘non-mishap’ household.21.  
 
Another plausible ‘demand’ side mechanism (Hunt 2006: 345) is rooted in the fact 
that a large share of the police’s  ‘clients’ are criminals who may be expected to have 
less qualms about getting involved in additional illegal transactions, e.g. corruption. A 
general fear of the police may induce citizens to propose bribes when no bribes are 
demanded. 
 
4.4 Police corruption and its transaction structure  
Variation in corruption frequencies across different public sectors may be explained 
from their ‘market’ structure: the different ways they may interact with the public. 
One important feature here is whether access to the official is determined by a queue 
                                                 
21 Note that when comparing the ICVS data with the Peru sample, all kinds of apparent inconsistencies 
arise. For example, in the ICVS survey Peru is listed among the countries that have a crime rate above 
40% (van Dijk 2008: 52) while Hunt (table 2) reports a crime rate from Peru of 3.4%. A strange feature 
of the ICVS questionnaires is that the different crimes reported increase the bribery rates related to 
each of the other types of officials with about the same rate as it did for the police. This aspect of the 
ICVS data may have stimulated the ‘mishap’ theory. Again the Peru-data appear more consistent. 
When Hunt’s (2007) whole battery of control variables is included it is mainly the bribes related to the 
police and the judiciary that increases with crimes.   
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or not.22 And if so, how long and time consuming are the queues? Hunt (2006) ex-
plains much of the empirical variation of the bribery rates through the length of the 
lines, the value of the prize at the end together with the client characteristics. Obvi-
ously, the well-off clients are more likely to pay more frequently and to pay larger 
bribes in this situation. 
 
The courts fit nicely in with this theory: The judiciary processes are exceptionally 
time-consuming, the outcomes often extremely valuable and the waiting time consid-
erable. Recall that while the judiciary in Peru was only involved in 2% of the interac-
tions with the households, it counted for 12 % of the bribery episodes and 42% of the 
registered bribe income (Hunt 2006). Moreover, Hunt (2008: 6) shows that the well-
off pay significantly higher bribes to the judiciary (the average bribe increases from 
USD 11 in the lowest to USD160 in the highest quintile). The judiciary also has the 
lowest conclusion rates: only 54% of the clients concluded their business with the ju-
diciary within 12 months (Hunt 2006: 344). Furthermore, when being exposed to a 
crime, the clients not only increased their use of judiciary officials, they also had con-
siderably higher bribery rates than other users of this public service (Hunt 2007). 
 
While Hunt finds that the high incident of corruption in the judiciary in Peru fits in 
with her general theory that emphasizes relative delay, the police don’t fit, however. 
In most respects the police are at the other end: their conclusion rate is high.. Fur-
thermore, crime victims did not have higher bribery rates compared to other users of 
the police. Becoming a crime victim only increased the probability of getting involved 
with the police and thereby in the high bribery rate among anyone involved with the 
police.23 To explain the exceptionally high corruption frequency of the police-
household interactions, we may look at a different aspect of the transaction structures. 
First, that the police can extort bribes from their own choosing, and, second, that a 
large share of their clients are criminals who presumably will have less scruples in 
                                                 
22 Most public administrative processes have some queue characteristics even when no formal queue is 
organized:  the cases have to be handled in a sequence, each case is time consuming. More often than 
not, the cases are organized in sequences where one office has to handle the case before the next one 
may do its work. At any point cases may wait in line. When outside clients are interested in the out-
come they may be willing and able to pay in order to get ahead. Public officials internal to the process 
may neither have the incentive nor the ability to pay in cash to get their ‘babies’ ahead, but illegitimate 
bartering between officials is, of course, common.  
23 As pointed out in the first section, judiciary and police corruption is likely to interact. 
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engaging in criminal corrupt acts. Hunt’s mentioning of extortion combined with the 
freedom police have to initiate interactions, suggests that the immediate decisive fac-
tor is at the police end of the transaction. The fact that the police have legitimate in-
struments of violence is a key.  If effective, extortion implies that every corrupt trans-
action that the police initiate may be completed.  
          
5. How does police corruption vary across countries?  
Jennifer Hunt’s ‘mishap theory’ may explain both the cross-official- type and cross-
country variation in police corruption. Variation in crime levels is an obvious candidate 
for explaining the latter. Nevertheless, there are reasons to expect that different mecha-
nisms are at work. Some are likely to work mainly as spillover effects internal to the 
public sector and is likely to affect all public sectors, including the police, and vary 
from country to country. Others, like the poverty levels or attitudes to corruption among 
citizens will impact all bribery situations, including the ones with the police. This sec-
tion examines different indicators and evidence to explain variations in police corrup-
tion across countries.  
 
5.1 Indirect evidence and the role organized crime 
Indicators of the general corruption rates at the country level may be applied as predic-
tors of the levels of police corruption. Table 2 reports considerable cross-country varia-
tions. The data appear very noisy, however, but the intra-country variation between 
public sectors dominates, except for Thailand. Let us look briefly at some of the general 
indicators to complete the picture.  
 
The World Bank Institute’s ‘control of corruption’ indicator produces data about the 
aggregate perceived corruption level for almost every country in the world. However, 
a number of studies show that the WBI-indicators do not correlate well with the ques-
tionnaire-based data on petty corruption that is closer to most forms of police corrup-
tion, which we have otherwise used (e.g. Razafindrakoto and Robaud 2006).24 In-
stead, let us consider the first column in the following table: 
                                                 
24 In a close-up study of TI’s Global Corruption 2004 Weber Abramo (2007) explores the data on ex-
perience and perceptions for the same sample of respondents from about sixty countries. He found that: 
(1) The respondents in his group of poor countries experienced ten times more often to pay a bribe than 
the respondents in the more wealthy countries. (2) The variation in GDP levels inside the group of 
wealthy countries vary strongly without affecting the (low) rate of experienced corruption, but corre-
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Table 3. Sub-regional distribution of street-level corruption,  
homicides incidence and perceived organized crime 
 
  % of 
households 
paying 
bribes last 
years* 
Organized 
crime percep-
tion index** 
Homicide per 
100 000 in 
2002*** 
North Africa 18,7 47 0,8 
West & Centr. Africa 38,9 61 4,1 
East Africa25  37,1 62 6,6 
Southern Africa 11,7 59 31,5 
North America 7,4 38 6,8 
Central America 11,1 57 15,8 
South America 16,3 63 15,5 
East Europe 22,1 80 11,7 
Southeast Europe 19 70 3,3 
West & Centr.Europe 4,8 22 2,5 
Near & Middle East 6 47 1,1 
Central Asia 19,6 61 6,7 
South Asia 23,1 61 5 
East & S.east Asia 9,4 47 2,7 
Oceania 0,5 7 3,4 
Caribbean                 .. 67 13,5 
World Average 16,4 53 8,2 
 
Source: * Figure 8.1 in van Dijk (2007); ** Figure 7.3 in van Dijk (2007); and  
*** Figure 4.1 in van Dijk (2007).  
 
 
The first column reproduces ICVS-data on reported bribes aggregated to sub-regions.  
It reflects the extent of street-level corruption paid by households. The third column 
about homicide rates are based on reports from police or health institutions. The sec-
ond column reports an indicator of organized crime developed by Buscaglia and van 
Dijk (2003). It is an indicator that may reflect more closely the extent of police cor-
ruption than the World Bank Institute’s corruption perception indicator. Empirical 
studies of police organizations in OECD countries strongly suggest that their corrup-
                                                                                                                                            
lates well with perceived corruption. (3) While the respondents in countries that have little experience 
have consistent views about the perceived extent of corruption and its effects, respondents in countries 
that had experience would tend to have inconsistent view.  The upshot of his research is that it throws 
considerable doubts about the validity of perceptions about corruption as an indicator of its real world 
prevalence. Some of the reason for this observed lack of coherence between experience and perception 
may be due to weaknesses of the survey he uses (TI 2004). 
25 The data for East Africa is not representative since an ICVS study made for Mauritius is included, 
and carries significant weight for this region’s average. 
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tion has evolved in connection with pockets of organized crime.26 Where there is little 
street level corruption to be observed, most police corruption will be tied to organized 
crime. Several indicators have been developed, including the one reported in Table 
3.27  
 
An effective and mostly non-corrupt police have proved to put effective brakes on the 
size and scope of organized crime (Reuter 1983). Empirical analysis of the develop-
ment of highly corrupt police units points to organized crime as a decisive influ-
ence.28 If we had a good cross-country index of the extent of organized crime, we 
may get a usable index of police corruption for OECD countries at the same time.  
                                                
 
As reported in van Dijk (2007, Figure 7.5), organized crime and perceived corruption 
(WBI indicator) are strongly correlated across countries. Hence, these two indicators 
of police corruption appear to yield the same picture. This is in one sense reassuring 
and interesting – if we can trust that the indexes reflect the activities their wording 
stand for. Furthermore, the corruption index is closely correlated with the level of 
economic development, which may indicate that the levels of police corruption may 
either shadow the economic development or maybe play a role in it. Alas, we have 
strong reasons to doubt these assertions. By their very construction they are built to 
correlate.  
 
 
26 The relationship between police corruption and organized crime is expected to be closer in high in-
come countries where street level police corruption, such as the extortion of road traffic, is relatively 
rare. 
27 The organized crime perception index (OCP) reported here consists in the averaging of two commer-
cial indexes for a large number of countries, one based on the World Economic Forum’s survey of in-
ternational business leaders’ perceptions of organized extortions, the other on judgments made by ex-
pert risk analysts at the Merchant International Group. It refers to the perception of activities like extor-
tion and various forms of trafficking (arms, people, drugs). The correlation between these two percep-
tion indexes is quite high, according to van Dijk (2007). At UNICRI the OCP index was developed 
further by adding the rate of unsolved homicides, a corruption index, an instrument reflecting percep-
tions of the extent of money laundering and the Schneider estimates of the size of the informal econ-
omy. The resulting composite index of organized crime (COCI) is described in Buscaglia and van Dijk 
(2003). The principles of the index are clearly outlined in their article: The first outlines a large number 
of factors that may have impact on organized crime and then determine the effective components 
through a factor analysis. The result is reported in van Dijk (2007, Table 7.1 ) and appears to consist of 
the organized perception factor.  
28 Here we refer to studies of the New York police in the early 1970s and 1990s, the Los Angeles po-
lice from the late 1990s, studies of the police in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland in Austra-
lia. Importantly, it was probably the impact of organized crime that led to the development of the un-
controlled corruption in Hong Kong in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Klitgaard 1988: 98 - 100).  
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5.2 Crime reporting 
So far we have not referred to official police reported crime rates, since they appear to 
have only a weak relationship to the rates of experienced crime.29 Nevertheless, po-
lice reported crime rates give interesting information. Rodrigo Soares (2004a, 2004b) 
interpret the difference between experienced and police reported rates of crime30 as (i) 
signals about the state of economic development (Soares 2004a), i.e. the police in 
richer countries report a higher fraction of  the crime; and (ii) as  signals about police 
presence, institutional stability and perceived corruption levels (Soares 2004b). If a 
transmission mechanism from crime to corruption exists, it must involve the police. 
Hence, the observed discrepancy between reported and experienced crime may also 
yield a noisy signal about the level of police corruption.31   
 
Crime reporting is obviously a complicated process, however. A fraction of crimes 
will be reported by the police itself through its monitoring of potential crime areas. 
Here the police organization itself plays a decisive role. The victim-initiated crime 
reports will normally constitute the large majority of cases, however. Here police be-
havior will only play an indirect, but important role as a rationing agent for the 
judges/court and by influencing expectations about the likelihood of catching the per-
petrator and punish him. This again will be influenced by the victims’ expectations 
about the efficiency and honesty of the police and the courts. In the extreme cases of 
police corruption, crime victims will have to consider whether the reporting of a crime 
will give the police an opportunity for extortion.   
 
The outcome of such considerations may result in an attempted report, but the police 
might still not register it. If the police do not, it will not be registered in the official 
                                                 
29 The average correlation coefficient of official reported crime and experienced crime are only 0.22  
for the  four types of crime registered, ranging zero for burglary to 0.36 for robbery (see Gibson and 
Kim 2006: 2). 
30 Presumably and in fact reporting rates will vary between different types of crime. Soares (2004a, 
2004b), like Azfar and Gurgur (2005), distinguishes between four groups of crime: Vehicle related 
theft; other theft; burglary and burglary attempts; and contact crimes, e.g. robbery, sexual assault, other 
assaults and violent threats.   
31 The research reported in this section is likely to become important for economic research on crime 
and for the consideration of whether and how crime (and therefore by implication police corruption) is 
tied to the really heavy and important processes in development. For example, was the common view 
that crime would increase with growth and with increasing inequality simply based on misinterpreta-
tion of crime report statistics?  Was not increasing crime rates an important part of the high costs of 
inequality-based growth as estimated by, for example, Bourguignon (1999), after all? The data from the 
victimization surveys have to be considered if we may bring back crime into the wider field of devel-
opment studies on a more solid empirical basis.     
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statistics of reported crime. Internal incentive systems will be important. Will the po-
lice organization be rewarded by the number of cases registered or by the ratio of 
solved cases? The behaviour of the courts is also clearly influential. What are their 
standards of proofs?  May they join in extortion schemes where crime is fabricated 
and/or known innocents convicted?  Soares’ (2004a 2004b) data suggest that the po-
lice-registered crime reflects to some degree this whole web of influences.  
 
Nevertheless, given a normal overload situation, it is the police that ration the set of 
cases. The police behaviour is then decisive. Hence, the discrepancy between experi-
enced crime rates and the police reported ones should reflect the behaviour of the jus-
tice system and not the crime victims’ behaviour. Their reporting will adjust to their 
experienced rate of rationing.32 In this light, Soares’s main result that reporting rates 
are strongly correlated with development (and negatively with perceived corruption) 
appears rather reasonable. That applies also to his claim that the positive association 
found in the literature between crime and development has been mainly driven by this 
reporting error. 
 
 Still, his findings that national income levels (and by implication perceived corrup-
tion, and then also police corruption) has hardly any impact on the rates of experi-
enced crime, appears somewhat counter-intuitive. The homicide rate is an exception. 
Another important result is that both economic growth and reduced inequality reduce 
experienced crime.33 In addition to the benefits it could bring by itself, low-inequality 
growth improves welfare also through its reduction of experienced crime. He finds 
that education reduces theft and the number of contact crimes.  
 
The crime victimization surveys contain not only information about the victims’ ex-
perience of crime, but also whether they report it or not, and if not, why they did not? 
The victims’ reports can be traced backed to individuals and recorded characteristics 
                                                 
32 The police’s rationing behavior will be influenced by the court’s rationing of cases. Hence, it is the 
behavior of the whole justice system that determines the police reporting. 
33 Soares’ (2004a, 2004b) use of panel data allows him to conclude that while the growth rate impacts 
crime internally, the effects of inequality he is able to trace, is a cross country effect. That is, countries 
with high growth rates do not necessarily experience lower rates of crime. But if a given country starts 
to grow its crime rates should on average go down. With inequality it is the opposite, or rather his data 
does not allow him to conclude anything if the inequality of a given country is reduced, only that coun-
tries with more inequality tend to have higher experienced crime rates. 
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of gender, age and (roughly) income levels. Presumably they reflect more of the re-
spondents’ considerations, and only indirectly the police behavior. Soares does not 
use this source of information. Azfar and Gurgur (2005) do so, however. They esti-
mate the impact of governance on crime and crime reporting distributions. The report-
ing behavior of crime victims across the world is summarized in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Share of crime victims who reported the offence to the police 
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                       Source: UNODC (2005: 50).  
            
The average rate for reporting a crime across countries varies between 26% (South 
and Central America) and 54% (North America), depending on the type of crime. For 
corruption it is as low as 3%. The risk when demanding a bribe from a household is 
evidently low for a police officer.    
 
5.3 The crime, crime reporting and police corruption nexus 
The ICVS survey data present information about both crime, crime reporting and po-
lice corruption rates. Crime reporting is the citizens’ reporting of crimes to the police, 
not the police’s own registered crime cases.  How are these variables connected? In 
Hunt’s analyses the crime rates apparently had a strong impact on corruption rates in 
general, and on police corruption in particular. Increased crime meant more police 
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corruption. May police corruption and crime reporting have feedback effects on crime 
rates itself? And does crime reporting impact police on corruption? 
 
Hunt (2007) interprets a citizen report on a crime as indicating a signal about use of 
police services. Reporting a crime increases the probability of meeting a police offi-
cer, which again increases the probability of completing a bribe. Empirically she does 
not receive support for this interpretation, however (ibid, table 4). 
 
Azfar and Gurgur (2005) suggest on the other hand that if the police is highly corrupt, 
the citizens will try to avoid the police whenever possible. Hence, they will tend not 
to report crimes.  Their interpretation seems supported by the ICVS-data where the 
respondents are asked their reasons for reporting or not reporting the crime: Further-
more, Azfar and Gurgur (2005) expect high reporting rates to have a preventive effect 
on both police corruption and crime. In Azfar and Gurgur (2008) they make an 
econometric exploration of  the whole crime-crime reporting –police corruption nexus 
based on ICVS data. Due to all the endogenous variation in the nexus, a number of 
instrument variables are introduced. A summary of the most interesting results of their 
3SLS analysis is the following: 
• crime rates increase with police corruption and decrease with crime reporting; 
• crime reporting rates decline with police corruption and crime rates; and  
• police corruption declines with crime reporting and crime rates. 
 
The two first results appear reasonable, but not the last one: that the extent of police 
corruption will decrease with an increased crime rate. This result is, on the other 
hand, strongly counterintuitive, and contradicting Hunt’s convincing descriptive sta-
tistics referred to above. How to explain the contradiction? 
 
5.4 Regional-specific variation in crime rates and corruption levels 
Crime in general and violent crime in particular appear to show interesting regional 
variation . Regard the following table: 
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Table 4. Aggregate victimization rates by world regions (1988-1996) 
 
  
Burglary/ 
attempt 
Other 
 theft 
Violent 
crime 
Violence/ 
male 
Violence/
 Female 
Consumer 
fraud 
Corruption Any 
crime 
Western Europe 14,4 27,1 16 5 5 12,5 1,1 61,2 
New World 23,3 26,6 20 8,4 8 7,9 1 65,3 
Latin America 32,4 42,4 36 8 14,3 24,4 19,5 76,6 
Transition Coun-
tries 17,3 31,9 17 6,5 6 39,8 12,6 62 
Asia 11,3 30,3 13 2,4 4,8 27,6 20,2 45 
Africa 35,4 41,7 32 7,9 12,6 48,7 13,5 74 
World 20,4 32,3 20 6,2 7,4 29,4 11 63,7 
 
Source: Zvekic (2000, Table 2). 
 
 
Asian countries, in particular, have relatively low crime rates and high corruption 
rates. Shared neighbourhood characteristics of this kind may ‘spoil’ the results of 
country based cross-section analysis. Moreover, while street-level corruption is al-
most absent in high income countries, the crime rates are significant. One of the major 
factors causing shifts in police corruption rates between high and low income coun-
tries is due to the behaviour of traffic police.  
 .  
5.5 The traffic police 
Systematic collection of bribes by the traffic police is rare in OECD countries, but is a 
very visible feature in most low income countries. The mechanics is documented in an 
excellent research paper by Olken and Barron (2007) on the police’s collection of 
bribes along a road system that ties Aceh to more central parts of Sumatra in Indone-
sia. The authors focus on trucking. Members of the research group joined a number of 
trucks as assistants to the drivers, one assistant per driver. 304 trips to and from Aceh 
were observed. During each trip a number of control posts manned by the police had 
to be passed. In addition, drivers had to pay both organized crime units, often in coop-
eration with the police, and the police itself for protection against attacks on the road. 
Convoys were organized. Along the route there were four weighing stations that also 
demanded payment. The research team observed directly about 6 000 illegal payments 
 
During their period of observation the military withdrew from Aceh, and these posts 
were not re-manned by the police, so the researchers could observe the effects of the 
reduction of the number of control posts on the level of bribes at the remaining ones. 
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The prices on each post increased compared to the former situation with larger num-
ber of posts, but the total amount paid per trip declined. The prices were negotiated in 
a decentralized way. The driver proposed a price which was either accepted or re-
jected by the police. The size of the bribes was determined by the bargaining position 
at the given post. Hence, the bribes increased as the truck approached its end station, 
since it would then be more costly to return.34 If the officers displayed a gun, the price 
also increased, but less so. Altogether, bribe expenses constituted around 13% of the 
transport costs, a little more than the wage costs and a little less than the fuel costs.35 
In a smaller pilot project on the more trafficked Bandung - Java road the researchers 
observed that the payment was made through monthly payments to police officers 
with little collected at the check points. Another policy conclusion Olken and Barron 
(2007) make is that since the actual amount of corruption went down when the num-
ber of control posts decreased it may prove useful to reduce the number of (traffic) 
police in order to reduce police corruption.36  
 
A telling story about the potential effects of traffic police’s bribe taxes is anecdotal 
and from Cambodia. Nissen (2005: 69 –70 refers to the experience of a well educated 
farmer who only use 10% of his land to a large degree because “I need to pay at many 
checkpoints and that eats up all the profit”. In this case, the police had completely sti-
fled the growth of any market for his agricultural goods. 
 
6. Some economic consequences of police corruption  
This section explores the wider welfare consequences of extensive police corruption, 
and it’s interaction with more ‘overarching’ human development processes. 
 
                                                 
34 A similar effect is visible in the bribing structure of procurement processes. While bribers pay only a 
small amount to get into the list of qualified bidders, the bribe for the actual contract is at a different 
level.  
35 Similar extortions take place daily along a number of Asian roads without being observed by social 
scientists. For instance, The Daily Star of Bangladesh reports about a cattle trader from the village 
Nonagon that had to pay Taka 4500 in extortion money to the police personnel and mastans [organized 
criminals] at eight different places along the way just to enter the famous Gabtoli market. A similar 
pattern of extortion follows when the cattle are freighted out from the market. One of the implications 
of this regular extortion is that the normal prices increases by 15% to 20% (The Daily Star, 6 January 
2007). 
36 The authors make a number of other interesting observations about the actual bribing structure in this 
situation. Moreover, in our view, the main contribution of the project is methodological: it shows that 
with imagination it is possible to observe directly instances of police corruption in a mass scale that we 
previously believed was impossible. 
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6.1 The relationship between police corruption and political elite behavior 
When wealthy and influential interests bribe the police to chase out poor house-
owners to build profitable industrial plants, as they have done in number of countries, 
it is police corruption in the service of the elite. It may contribute to speeding up 
growth, as pointed out by Mushtaq Khan (2004), but the outcomes are frequently un-
fair and may throw households unexpectedly into deep poverty. 
 
In situations where the political leadership’s survival is at stake and will be defended 
by armed means, the police may be assigned a larger scope of action.37 Power will be 
shifted towards the public organizations that dispose instruments of violence with the 
increasing levels of illegal violence. This will give the police more opportunities for 
private income, but also more dangerous work. But as the scale of violence increases, 
power shifts to the military, and the police’s role as an information provider will be-
come paramount. In relation to armed conflicts, the police’s main historical role is in 
the process that is triggering conflicts and in the aftermath, not during the peak of 
armed struggle. Especially, the role of the police in the aftermath of conflicts has at-
tracted considerable attention by the international foreign aid community.  
 
The police’s triggering role, however, has been neglected. In cases where the regime 
has been mainly challenged through its own weakening, it is reasonable to expect that 
weakened monitoring of the police evolves in a way such that both increased police 
violence and police corruption develop simultaneously. In addition to its access to 
violent instruments, a key characteristic of the police’s part in the battery of public 
controls is its role in monitoring geographical space and collect information about it. 
This knowledge is extremely valuable for gaining political control and is often also 
used by politicians in peaceful democratic contests. This is, we believe, a major rea-
son why the police (sometimes together with organized crime) are allowed to cash in 
on the cooperation with politicians at election times. The power acquired by the police 
in this way might sometimes be displayed by an open, often arrogant, economic ex-
ploitation of the citizens even in democracies like India.   
 
                                                 
37 A well-know historical example where the police were both corrupt and contributed to a regime 
down fall was during the Kuomintang ‘s rule of China during the interwar period. This conflict was 
fought at such a scale that the military’s behavior was more decisive, however. 
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6.2 Mechanisms where police corruption may affect economic growth 
A corrupt police service may have considerable negative impacts on growth through 
its monitoring of space, when it use that to tax business directly through own preda-
tion, or by supplying protection in competition or partly in cooperation with organized 
crime units. The crime-police corruption nexus impacts on growth works mainly 
through three mechanisms:  
• It stifles or slows the growth of small enterprises through direct illegal taxation 
much in the same manner as a mafia organization. While police corruption and 
the size of the informal economy are likely to be positively correlated, the po-
lice’s bribe collection, even without formal taxes in place, may stifle the 
growth of the informal urban economy. 
 
• Police corruption on its own may break budding growth in rural areas through 
illegal taxation of transport. 
• The nexus has a negative impact on foreign direct investment.38 
  
6.3 Police corruption, economic inequality and human insecurity  
Soares (2004a, 2004b) and Azfar and Gurgur (2005) have in different ways demon-
strated that:  
1) Increased inequality increases the rates of (victim) crimes. Furthermore, Azfar 
and Gurgur have showed that: 
2) In countries  with low  government effectiveness (which practically coincide 
with countries with high aggregate perceived corruption levels) and high  in-
come inequality, females and poor households are more likely to experience 
crime and less likely to report them than in more equal countries. 
3) Jennifer Hunt (2008) has recently estimated how the impacts of corruption on 
different income groups vary with the kinds of public officials involved. She 
finds that police corruption hits lower income groups harder than the judiciary.  
                                                 
38 Detailed evidence of the first mechanism has been mainly provided by data from Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. For the second effect, we have general econometric studies of the impacts of 
aggregate corruption. Another type of evidence has been through business surveys. For instance, 
Shang-Jing Wei (2000) and others show that police corruption has significantly negative impacts on 
business activities. Data from China and South Korea have been core evidence in identifying the main 
constrains on enterprises. The World Bank’s BEEPS surveys, first mainly from the former socialist 
countries and then brought in from the whole world, place surprisingly strong weight to crime rates.  
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 6.4 Police corruption: a mixed bag of effects 
The large number of people who are maimed and killed on the roads in developing 
countries is a huge problem that still has not received the public attention it deserves. 
Bertrand et al (2006) have studied in detail the effects of corruption on driving skills 
in New Delhi. They found that driving skills had no effect on who got the driving li-
cense. The applicants acquired the license through middlemen in any case, i.e. indi-
viduals who knew the bureaucracy and paid the bribes on behalf of the applicants. 
Prospective drivers had no immediate incentive for learning to drive. While the main 
agency here was not the police, the traffic police operate under the same principles 
and extort and punish independent of the drivers’ mistakes. Police corruption is one 
factor that contributes to the killing fields that the roads of many developing countries 
often are. 
The effects of police corruption on organized crime are also clear, at least if we accept 
the indicators of organized crime that are developed in the literature. As noted, Peter 
Reuter’s (1983) case study from New York also strongly suggests that substantial po-
lice corruption is a condition for large scale organized crime to develop. An effect of 
aggregate (perceived) corruption on homicide rates has been demonstrated by Azfar 
(2005: 286).  Corruption in the police is again the most likely mechanism. 
The police corruption-organized crime complex allows increased consumption of ille-
gal services (as gambling and prostitution) and goods (drugs, poisoned liquors, blas-
phemous texts in Muslim countries etc.), and the size of the informal economy, with 
all its effects on effective taxation. A problem by exposing these as separate effects is 
that they are among the causes as well as the effects of police corruption. 
 
7. Police corruption as a policy issue  
Police corruption is not the same issue in high and low income areas. Corruption in-
side the police in high income countries may normally be studied in isolation and. 
dealt with by a separate policy specifically directed at the police organizations them-
selves. These measures may also be relevant in low income countries, since the police 
bureaucracies involved are in many ways similar, but they are hardly sufficient. The 
same applies to legalization measures. Petty corruption by the police is unique to low 
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income and has to be dealt with as a part of a larger corruption complex. The tax sys-
tem is the most likely candidate. 
 
7.1 Legalization of illegal goods and services  
There is one set of measures that may be applied in both rich and non-rich countries: 
legalize formally illegal goods and services. The legalizing (either de facto or de jure) 
of homosexual bars and (partially) gambling reduced significantly the size of the or-
ganized crime- police corruption clusters in New York. Legalization of prostitution, 
gambling, alcohol and various types of drugs may all be worth considering in a low 
income context. An important but little noticed component of the successful anti-
corruption policies in Hong Kong was the legalization and partial deregulation of the 
mini-bus system (Lee 1979: 5 – 6). The experiences from Hong Kong are interesting 
since first the police milked the illegal companies directly in competition (or coopera-
tion) with organized crime units. After the legalization in 1969 the police could con-
tinue the milking of companies through their ability to deliver traffic fines, but organ-
ized crime apparently had not the same opportunities. While helpful, legalization was 
not sufficient to get rid of police corruption. It had to be complemented with other 
measures.39  
 
To legalize illegal markets, particularly drug and prostitution markets, is tempting 
from an economist’s point of view. Here it is, however, extremely important to note 
that regulations may have a structure that can create surprising spillovers across the 
regulated sectors. For example, if prostitution is legalized, but most prostitutes are 
foreigners (for example, Nepalese in India), their stay in the country may still be ille-
gal and the police’s bribe-harvesting from their activities may only be moved from the 
vice squad to the immigration authorities. If combined with stricter deportation rules, 
the legalization of prostitution may even increase the size of trafficking, since it re-
duces the risk for the people financing the migration of prostitutes, increases the 
power of pimps over the prostitutes, and the police’s bribe income.40 Regarding drug 
legalization, the cross-country spillovers are probably so strong that only international 
efforts are worth considering. 
                                                 
39 The stimulation of police corruption due to illegal drug transactions are well  documented from a 
number of scandals and public commissions  from New York, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Sydney, 
Melbourne and a number of other cities. 
40 Some of these issues are studied by Friedel and Guriev (2006).  
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 7.2 Other measures to reduce police corruption in both poor and rich countries  
One reason for police corruption in both poor and non-poor countries is comparatively 
low wages for the police. When public officials are asked about their perceptions 
about the causes of corruption, this is their favorite answer. It is an argument that 
should be researched carefully, however. Sometimes the issue is rather excessive in-
come expectations among public sector employees (compared to the surrounding pov-
erty and the government’s tax potential). The income expectations are often fuelled by 
the comparison of their income with the income levels of the international aid bu-
reaucracies and consultants. Afghanistan is an extreme case in this respect, with dev-
astating impacts on police accountability. When affordable, increased wages and edu-
cation levels of the police have proved crucial to reduce corruption levels, - and not 
only among the police. These measures were important components in the two cases 
we know of fast working anti-corruption packages; Singapore and Hong Kong. 
 
The scope for extortion may be significantly reduced by making the arresting process 
more transparent. Granting stronger rights for suspects to inform relatives about ar-
rests or police confinement has become easier with the spread of mobile phones in 
poor areas. 
 
7.3 Clamp down on the traffic police 
The open extortion and rent collection of the traffic police are so visible that it should 
be possible to address directly. Instead of making foreign aid conditional on rather 
vague and general governance indicators, one may make it conditional on reducing 
the number of police roadblocks and the intensity of the bribe collection of the traffic 
police. This could be monitored through random research experiments in the manner 
of the research project by Olken and Barron in Indonesia. 
 
In addition to its direct harmful effects on transport and the build up of markets for 
rural goods, corruption by the traffic police has a strong signal effect due to its visibil-
ity. It tells the public that corruption is permitted and that the guardians of the law are 
permitted to violate it.  
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7.4 What to do with police corruption when the whole regime floats? 
What to do with police corruption when corruption permeates the public apparatus 
almost everywhere? This is in a sense a problem of a different kind than the one we 
have discussed so far, with the exception of corruption in the traffic police. This is a 
situation where regular policy thinking tends to break down. To solve a policy prob-
lem, we normally consider a policy instrument that a public agency may manipulate to 
improve an existing situation. It is exogenous. In the case of extensive corruption, 
however, that way of thinking breaks down in two ways.  
 
Extensive corruption implies that the main problem is located among the agents sup-
posed to dispose policy instruments. Corruption is a crime and the regular agencies 
that should deal with it are the courts and the police. When they are corrupt no one in 
decision-making positions may be able and/or have an interest in doing anything, ex-
cept the citizens who are taxed by it, but they rarely have the power to act effectively 
in this matter. In such situations it is difficult to suggest concrete policy proposals ex-
cept for pious wishes for a change in the top political leadership. 
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